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Abstract	<p>The purpose of this study is to test whether groups with different cultural cognition orientations construct different stories about the same policy issue given the same information. We employed a focus group methodology to assemble participants with similar cultural dispositions and used the Narrative Policy Framework to examine the policy narratives that groups form about campaign finance. Our analyses indicate that the stories these homogeneous cultural groups tell associate political process concerns related to campaign finance to their core cultural values. Even when provided with the same information, the stories that the groups produced varied along theoretically consistent cultural dimensions. Our findings show the narrative cores displayed similar attribution of the problem to intentional human action; however we observed variation in the manner in which certain characters were assigned blame, and significant differences in the density of several of the narrative networks. We found that differences in presence of victims emerged along the <i>grid</i> dimension of cultural cognition with egalitarian narratives cores possessing victims, whereas hierarchist narratives did not. A difference that emerged along the <i>group</i> dimension of cultural cognition was the core narrative of individualist groups generated policy solutions, while communitarian narrative cores did not.</p>
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Keywords (separated by '-')	Narrative policy framework - Social network analysis - Cultural cognition - Campaign finance reform
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Footnote Information



1 The stories groups tell: campaign finance reform 2 and the narrative networks of cultural cognition

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4
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6 Abstract

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8 tations construct different stories about the same policy issue given the same information.
9 We employed a focus group methodology to assemble participants with similar cultural **AQ1**
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23 **Keywords** Narrative policy framework · Social network analysis · Cultural cognition ·
24 Campaign finance reform

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25 **1 Introduction**

26 The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) posits narrative as a fundamental driver of policy
27 change, policy outcomes, and policy processes. While NPF scholars have made inroads in
28 explaining narrative's role in shaping these important public policy dependent variables
29 (Jones and McBeth 2010; Shanahan et al. 2011, 2013, 2018a; McBeth et al. 2014; Jones
30 et al. 2014), there is still a considerable amount to be learned about the processes by which
31 policy narratives are formed. The research presented here speaks to this gap by explor-
32 ing the formative processes whereby cultural orientations impact the story that groups
33 generate about campaign finance reform, a low salience policy issue. To accomplish this
34 task, we analyze transcripts of four focus groups conducted in the summer of 2011. Each
35 one of the four groups were designed to be culturally homogeneous and distinct. A mod-
36 erator initiated a discussion of the current system of campaign finance and allowed the
37 group to develop their own explanation of its functions, strengths, and weaknesses. After
38 this explanation emerged, the moderator presented the group with an information packet
39 containing facts about campaign financing in the United States, and a specific proposal to
40 reform the existing campaign finance system. Given that the group was prescreened for
41 interest in campaign finance, but also knew little about the information presented to them,
42 we hypothesized that each group would use narratives rooted in their cultural orientations
43 to make sense of campaign finance reform. Our hypothesis was confirmed. Indeed, each
44 group formed a culturally specific policy narrative about campaign finance reform that was
45 distinct from the other groups. In what follows, we first provide some background infor-
46 mation about the development of United States campaign finance reform policy. Next, we
47 describe the theories that drove our research design, followed by a discussion of the data
48 and methods. Finally, we provide an analysis of the distinct narratives generated by each
49 culturally specific focus group. We focus on the observed variation between the presence or
50 absence of particular narrative elements and the manner in which these elements are con-
51 nected along lines consistent with cultural cognition theory (Kahan 2012).

52 **2 Campaign finance reform: a brief review**

53 Ever since currency encountered democratic governance in the United States, funding
54 political campaigns has been a troublesome aspect of the democratic process. Louise Over-
55 acker, an early scholar of United States money and politics, observed that the "...financ-
56 ing of elections in a democracy is a problem of...increasing concern" (1932, p. vii). Since
57 then, the United States campaign finance regulatory apparatus has come to reflect that
58 concern. The Mugwump crusade against government corruption in the post-Civil War era
59 and the Progressive agenda at the turn of the 20th Century did much to instill a culture of
60 regulation (La Raja 2008). Rooted in anti-partisan sentiment that celebrated the ability of
61 the individual to make objective and rational decisions, Progressive-era reforms generated
62 a complicated fabric of regulation including civil service reforms, ballot-design revision,
63 financial disclosure requirements, and both expenditure and contribution limits, in various
64 combinations across the states by 1928 (La Raja 2008). But it was not until recently that
65 the greatest changes in the national structure of campaign finance developed.

66 The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 and subsequent amendments
67 codified many national regulations governing individuals, parties, and political action

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68 committees (PACs). It also established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to
69 oversee campaign spending and the newly created presidential matching fund program.
70 Some of the provisions of FECA were overturned in *Buckley v. Valeo*, illuminating
71 an ongoing tension between popular will manifest in the legislature and the constitu-
72 tionality of that will defined by the Supreme Court. It wasn't until 2002 that Congress
73 would follow up FECA with major campaign finance reform.

74 The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Act of 2002 (BCRA), also known as McCain-
75 Feingold, raised the individual contribution limits but focused primarily on soft
76 money, defined as those “funds given by corporations, unions, and wealthy individ-
77 uals” and used by parties for non-electioneering functions such as get out the vote
78 efforts and other party-building activities (Powell 2010, pp. 14–15). BCRA served to
79 “(1) ban soft money fundraising and spending by political parties and (2) prohibited
80 the use of soft money by any organization and on advertisements 30 days before a
81 primary and 60 days before a general election in which a federal candidate was on the
82 ballot” (La Raja 2008, pp. 106–107).

83 In 2010, the Supreme Court stepped in, and in a close 5–4 ruling in *Citizens United*
84 *v. Federal Election Commission* held that the limits placed on corporations and unions
85 were unconstitutional. Specifically, these entities had the same right as individuals to
86 make independent campaign expenditures. In practice, this ruling meant that corpora-
87 tions and unions could spend as much as they wanted to in their efforts to shape elec-
88 tion outcomes. Of course, the average American citizen is unaware of most, if not all,
89 of this.

90 Citizens in the United States are quick to voice their dissatisfaction with the role of
91 money politics (e.g. Jorgensen et al. 2018; Shaw and Ragland 2000) and are quick to
92 point out that they endorse reform of the political system (e.g., Pew Research Center
93 2018; Jorgensen et al. 2018; La Raja and Schaffner 2011). Despite this trend, campaign
94 finance is a low salience issue and Americans—even citizens concerned about it—
95 know little about campaign finance policy (Jorgensen et al. 2018). Thus, we can expect
96 that most Americans would not have a detailed grasp of campaign finance law (Milyo
97 and Primo 2017), which makes this issue ideal for conducting research about the nar-
98 ratives groups form when their members encounter complex information environments
99 that they have little knowledge of prior to entering the environment.

100 **3 Groups and their stories: political culture, cultural cognition,** 101 **and the narrative policy framework**

102 Sustained social interactions—and the lasting effects wrought about by those inter-
103 actions—are what we might mean when we invoke the idea of culture. The study of
104 political culture is concerned with the lasting and systematic effects of that culture
105 on phenomena distinctly political—how we organize, decide, govern, and the like.
106 With a concept so vast, it should not be surprising that no single, monolithic academic
107 approach to political cultural has emerged. Below we briefly discuss several of the
108 scholarly approaches to political culture and why we have chosen cultural cognition as
109 a way to empirically measure culture in our research. We then detail the four cultural
110 orientations of cultural cognition. Finally, we describe the Narrative Policy Framework
111 as a way to measure the ways in which different cultural groups tell their stories.

112 3.1 Political culture

113 The concept of political culture has been under near continuous development since its
114 introduction by Almond (1956). Perhaps most influential in this development is the semi-
115 nal study by Almond and Verba (1963) where the researchers developed a tripartite cat-
116 egorization scheme of *subject culture*, *parochial culture*, and *participant culture*. Other
117 approaches have since also garnered considerable attention. For example, Elazar's (1984)
118 three-part characterization of US political culture as moralistic, individualistic, or tradi-
119 tionalist has inspired many studies such as those examining public policy (e.g., Morgan and
120 Watson 1991) and electoral outcomes (e.g., Fisher 2016a, b), to note but a few. Another
121 macro-approach to the study of culture was pioneered by Geert Hofstede, who developed
122 his *cultural dimensions* framework based on four different cultural dimensions, which
123 facilitated a great deal of research in cross-cultural comparison, especially in the fields of
124 management and the study of organizations (e.g., Hofstede 2003). As seen above, political
125 culture theorizing has given birth to a variety of ways to conceptualize or name dimensions
126 of political culture. Here we have selected the cultural cognition (e.g., Kahan et al. 2011)
127 approach for assessing political culture, a derivative of Cultural Theory (Thompson et al.
128 1990), which has shown itself to scale well from macro-levels of analysis (e.g., national)
129 all the way down to individuals (see Swedlow 2011 for an overview), which serves our
130 purposes well in attempting to understand variation in narratives across culturally homog-
131 enous groups of individuals.

132 3.2 Cultural cognition

133 Recognizing that individuals make sense of the world through the understandings they
134 share with their communities, anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron
135 Wildavsky began working on the cultural theory of risk in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Dou-
136 glas 1974; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). This early work eventually culminated in a formal
137 approach to the study of culture more generally, titled Cultural Theory (CT) (Thompson
138 et al. 1990). Subsequent research has built on this classic variant of CT and has offered
139 insights into decision-making (e.g., Chai et al. 2011), public preferences (e.g., Jones 2011),
140 and institutions (Lockhart 2011), to cite just a few areas of inquiry (see Mamadouh 1999;
141 Swedlow 2011, 2014). At the heart of CT are two dimensions that allow researchers to sort
142 individuals by cultural orientation. CT theorizes that individuals orient themselves using
143 preferences for group belonging (Group) and the extent to which groups are allowed or
144 expected to prescribe behaviors (Grid). This research relies upon a variant of CT known as
145 cultural cognition.

146 Cultural cognition (CC), like CT, measures individual beliefs on the aforementioned
147 dimensions: hierarchy-egalitarianism measures grid, while individualism-communitari-
148 anism measures group (Kahan et al. 2011, p. 8). This produces four ways of life: hierar-
149 chical-individualism (HI), hierarchical-communitarianism (HC), egalitarian-individualism
150 (EI), and egalitarian-communitarianism EC, (also referred to as egalitarian solidarism, see
151 Fig. 1) (Kahan et al. 2011, p. 9).

152 Each quadrant is theorized to capture latent cultural predispositions of individuals who
153 view the world through a specific filter that works to produce systematic cognitive biases.
154 These biases influence how people process new information. Confirmation bias is a process
155 whereby individuals are predisposed to accept information that affirms their priors (i.e.

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


Fig. 1 Cultural cognition

156 culture), while disconfirmation bias predisposes individuals to reject information or stimuli
 157 that does not (e.g., Lodge and Taber 2007). Together, these processes are understood as
 158 identity protective cognition (Kahan et al. 2007, 2011) and its influence over how incoming
 159 information is processed is substantial, particularly as it relates to risk. For example, hierar-
 160 chical-communitarians view gun control as high threat, egalitarian-communitarians do not;
 161 hierarchical-communitarians find abortions a high threat, individualist-communitarians do
 162 not (see Kahan 2012).

163 Kahan (2012) describes the hierarchical-individualist who values structure but also feels
 164 less constrained by groups:

165 Think of the iconic American cowboy, the “Marlboro Man”: He bridles at outside
 166 interference with the operation of his ranch, yet still exerts authority over a small
 167 community whose members—from ranch hands, to wives, to sons and daughters—
 168 all occupy scripted, hierarchical roles (p. 735).

169 Similarly, hierarchical-communitarians value hierarchy but also place value on group
 170 membership. Individuals in the military or members of a rules-based religion are likely to
 171 end up in this quadrant. Egalitarian-communitarians recoil from hierarchy and prefer to see
 172 themselves as part of a larger community. Many environmentalists fall into this category.
 173 Egalitarian-individualists fall in the bottom left quadrant and favor equality, having distaste
 174 for hierarchies, and favor markets and other mechanisms that allow individuals to com-
 175 pete fairly. Each of these groups views the world differently and can take the exact same

176 information and come to quite different—indeed, polar opposite—conclusions about risk
177 (Kahan et al. 2011).

178 Cultural worldview has an impact on how individuals understand public policy prob-
179 lems, and the solutions they find acceptable (Zanocco and Jones 2018). When investigat-
180 ing the power of scientific research to convince laypersons, Kahan et al. (2011) found that
181 participants' acceptance of an academic as an "expert" varied in accordance with their
182 grid and group scores. Additionally, Kahan et al. (2007) found that neither race nor gen-
183 der influenced risk assessment alone but acted "in conjunction with distinctive worldviews
184 that themselves feature either gender or race differentiation or both in social roles involv-
185 ing putatively dangerous activities" (Kahan et al. 2007, p. 3). Such studies demonstrate
186 that bias in assessing scientific evidence can be explained, partially, by cultural cognitive
187 commitments.

188 Kahan et al. (2010) use CC to explain opposition or support for outpatient commitment
189 laws (OCLs). In this study, the researchers test CC hypotheses applied to a policy dispute
190 where expert consensus is not present, as OCLs have only recently emerged as a policy
191 controversy. Kahan et al. (2010a) found that higher scores on individualism were associ-
192 ated with less support for OCLs while increased hierarchy was associated with stronger
193 support for OCLs.

194 Kahan et al.'s (2010) study of the vaccination of young women for human papilloma
195 virus (HPV) found that "biased assimilation" in addition to "source credibility" (Kahan
196 et al. 2010b) influenced the stance taken toward the desirability of vaccination. They dis-
197 covered that individuals who were more individualistic and hierarchical were more con-
198 cerned about the negative consequences of the vaccine, while egalitarian and communitar-
199 ian individuals were less concerned (Kahan et al. 2010b, p. 511).

200 Furthering this avenue of exploration into public policy areas lacking expert scientific
201 consensus on the desirability of particular policy solutions, the work of Kahan et al. (2011)
202 cited above is relevant to questions of campaign finance reform, as no scientific consensus
203 on the desirability of one campaign financing system over another exists. Their work sug-
204 gests that cultural differences are likely to drive the types of reform initiatives that indi-
205 viduals find desirable. This research explores how individuals utilize narratives to come to
206 those varying conclusions. To do so, we leverage the NPF.

207 3.3 Narrative policy framework

208 Narratives are the primary means by which human beings make sense of the world (e.g.,
209 Jones 2018; Shanahan et al. 2018b; White 1981, 1987). The NPF measures this sense-mak-
210 ing through narrative content and form. Narrative form can be effectively conceived as a
211 constellation of structural elements which are likely to be featured in all policy narratives,
212 such as the kind of narrative likely to develop in a discussion of campaign finance reform.
213 The NPF posits four main narrative elements that constitute form: *characters* (e.g., a vil-
214 lain who causes a harm; a victim who is harmed; and a hero whose action helps the victim
215 and stops the villain); *the moral of the story*, or the policy solution (what the hero does to
216 address the harm); *the setting* of the tale (where the narrative takes place); and *the plot*
217 (which lays out the interactions over time between characters and the setting). Within the
218 NPF, these elements are fundamental facets of narrative that can be identified, quantified,
219 and compared across policy areas (Jones 2018; Shanahan et al. 2018b).

220 Narrative content, on the other hand, may be quite specific to the policy area in ques-
221 tion. For example, narratives about tariffs on international trade may have little in common

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with policy narratives about manned space exploration. Systemic understandings of narrative content can thus be difficult (referred to as the problem of narrative relativity within the NPF—see Jones et al. 2014). To attempt to produce generalizable findings relative to narrative content, the NPF argues that one must understand the belief systems individuals and groups use to help them attach meaning to the varied content of narratives (characters, symbols, evidence, etc.). For example, Hillary Clinton, as a character within a policy narrative, is likely to generate quite predictable—and opposite—emotional reactions from individuals belonging to liberal and conservative networks or groups in the United States. Beliefs are thus the “glue” that often hold groups and coalitions together (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) and have been measured in past NPF studies to understand policy differences (e.g., McBeth et al. 2005).

Through narratives individuals are able to emphasize certain aspects of reality while drawing attention away from other facets of reality deemed to be of lesser import (Gilovich 1991; Shanahan et al. 2018c). In doing so, narratives ascribe differential value and assert relationships, they function to convey right and wrong, virtue and vice, and to sculpt contours of group membership so individuals can be placed in epistemic communities. Narratives also employ particular strategies, such as causal mechanisms in their quest to identify a particular group, phenomenon, or institution, that is responsible for the existence or emergence of a particular public problem (Shanahan et al. 2018b). This process is fundamentally social, and it means that narrative transmits culture, as maxims, rules-of-thumb, and common sense (as well as more technical information) between individuals. Thus, it is posited that while individuals do make sense of the world on their own, when they are confronted with new or complex information, individuals likely turn to their group culture to narratively structure that information, assess threats, and make sense of the world more generally. In this research, Cultural cognition, operationalized as a subset of the NPF belief system classification, is theorized to drive said story creation.

4 Data and methods

In this research, the unit of analysis is the group narrative produced by individual actors within a culturally congruent focus group. Four groups were utilized, as defined by cultural cognition. Of primary concern was the way in which a group’s culture structures narrative formation in low salience, low information policy areas. Each group was primed for discussion by prompting each member to describe the current state of the United States of America, in a single word (uncertain, terrible, etc.). The moderator then asked individuals to expand upon the reasoning behind their word choice. This opened the discussion on the participants’ terms and established the focus group a place where the moderator plays a reserved role. After a brief conversation, the moderator presented information about United States campaign finance policy, an issue with low salience and that most Americans know very little about. Narrative theory and previous research (Song et al. 2014) suggest that individuals will rely on their familiar groups to make sense of the information through storytelling. Drawing from the extant literature, we seek to answer these research questions:

RQ1: Do groups composed of individuals with different CC worldviews form narratives distinct from one another when asked about campaign finance reform?

RQ2: Does the provision of additional information with regard to campaign finance reform result in changes to the structure of narratives produced in focus groups with homogenous CC worldviews?

267 The subsequent sections address the research design utilized in this study.

268 4.1 Data

269 To address our research questions, we conducted four focus groups in Oklahoma City
270 in June of 2011. Each focus group consisted of pre-screened participants that were paid
271 seventy-five dollars for their services. In April of 2011, a pool of voluntary respondents
272 was screened for one of the four focus groups based on specific criteria. First, potential
273 participants were screened for a minimal interest in campaign finance reform.¹ The logic
274 behind this criterion was that a minimal interest level would make participants more likely
275 to engage and think seriously about the issue in the focus group setting. To determine the
276 cultural affinities of participants, each was asked to respond to two batteries of statements,
277 where each represents one dimension of cultural cognition: hierarchy—egalitarianism (i.e.,
278 grid) and individualism—communitarianism (i.e., group), respectively. Each battery con-
279 sisted of six statements typical of CC studies (e.g., Kahan et al. 2011, p. 27) where each
280 statement was a simple dichotomous agree or disagree, coded one or zero, respectively.
281 Responses were then summed for each dimension.² Intersecting the two orthogonal dimen-
282 sions of hierarchy—egalitarianism and individualism—communitarianism produces four
283 distinct cultural quadrants: hierarchical-communitarian, hierarchical-individualist, egalitar-
284 ian-communitarian, and egalitarian-individualist. Since we are interested in evaluating the
285 effect of CC on sense-making narratives we wanted participants that were clearly in one
286 quadrant and not individuals from the center of the distributions. We selected 10 partici-
287 pants for each group that scored in the top and bottom quartiles for each of the two dimen-
288 sions.³ The logic was that these individuals, when placed in groups, would produce more
289 distinguishable cultural narratives than individuals with more centrist responses. This pro-
290 cess produced four focus groups with 10 non-centrist cultural types in each (see Appendix

¹ On a scale from one to six, where one is strongly disagree and six is strongly agree, potential participants were asked to respond to the following screening question: *The way in which congressional campaigns are currently financed and paid for is in need of serious reform.* Participants that agreed with the above statement (responses ranging from 4 to 6) continued on to the next selection process where they were screened for their cultural cognition affinities.

² For the hierarchy—egalitarianism dimension, agreement with egalitarian affiliated statements received a -1 , while disagreement received a $+1$; similarly, for the same dimension, hierarchy affiliated statements received a $+1$ for agreement and a -1 for disagreement. The scores were then aggregated producing a single hierarchy score for each potential participant ranging from -6 to $+6$, where a strongly negative score denoted an egalitarian orientation, while a strongly positive score denoted a hierarchical orientation. The same process was conducted for the individualism--communitarianism dimension. Agreement with individualism affiliated statements received a -1 , while disagreement received a $+1$; similarly, communitarian affiliated statements received a $+1$ for agreement and a -1 for disagreement. The scores were then aggregated producing a single summative communitarian score for each potential participant ranging from -6 to $+6$, where a strongly negative score denoted an individualist orientation, while a strongly positive score denoted a communitarian orientation. To test H3, the CC scores were weighted by respondents' response to the screening question (Mildly Agree = $\times 1.0$; Agree = $\times 1.25$; and Strongly Agree = $\times 1.50$). The idea being that if the issue is seen as more important to an individual, the more likely they are to have developed at least a cursory impression and are able to convey this to the group.

³ The top quartiles had scores ranging from $+4$ to $+6$, while the bottom quartiles had scores ranging from -4 to -6 for each of the two dimensions. While 10 participants accepted the invitation to participate, actual attendance ranged from 8 to 10 individuals.

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291 1 for instrument). Each focus group ran for approximately 1½ h, was video recorded, and
292 professionally transcribed.⁴

293 The construction of each group reflected our desire for an environment that felt cul-
294 turally friendly for each participant. Once in this safe environment, participants were pre-
295 sented with campaign finance reform information. As Morgan observes, “what makes the
296 discussion in focus groups more than the sum of separate individual interviews is the fact
297 that the participants query each other and explain themselves to each other” (1996, p. 139).
298 Ryfe observes that participants “may argue, debate, or talk, but the clear pattern is that they
299 prefer to tell stories” (2006, p. 73). As Black notes, within groups, storytelling begets dia-
300 logue, which likely helps individuals within the group overcome any interpersonal differ-
301 ences that exist (Black 2008). Thus, group dynamics make a focus group an optimal setting
302 to observe the formation of sense-making narratives. Our expectation was that an organic
303 sense-making process would ensue whereby the group would form a narrative situating
304 the newly acquired information within their common culture. Given our expectations, our
305 methodological concerns required a specific moderating style.

306 Morgan (1996) describes two basic approaches to moderating focus groups: a more
307 structured environment imposes the researcher’s interest while less structure allows the
308 group to pursue its own interests (p. 145). Ryfe finds that in a deliberative setting the “open
309 and relaxed approach of facilitation is the most likely to engender more storytelling on the
310 part of participants” (2006, p. 75). Our aim was the latter and the moderator for each group
311 was given instructions to provide as little guidance as possible. Instead, the moderator
312 asked a limited set of pre-scripted questions and introduced the information on campaign
313 finance reform to the participants (see Appendix 2).⁵ This information included basic facts
314 about campaign finance law in the United States, statistics on who gives to campaigns, and
315 also described a proposed government-sponsored overhaul of the campaign finance system
316 aimed at reducing the impact of private money on elections. Outside of those functions,
317 the moderator was to let the participants do “the hard work of establishing who they are
318 in relation to others” (2006 p. 75). This meant that the moderator did not convey the exact
319 same information at the exact same time to each group (Table 1). As such, both network
320 and traditional statistical measures are utilized to compare the group narratives prior to the
321 introduction of information. Comparisons between pre- and post-information period are
322 undertaken within group only, not across groups, and do not employ traditional statistical
323 measures.

324 4.2 Methods

325 This study employs a deductive coding scheme to analyze narrative differences between
326 the four focus groups. We rely on previous NPF codebooks to guide our coding of the
327 transcripts (see Shanahan et al. 2018b, c). The texts were coded for characters (consisting

⁴ These data were collected in conjunction with the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale University and the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University. We thank the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics for their generous grant which made collecting these data possible.

⁵ Note that such an approach contrasts the more conventional way to conduct focus groups where efforts might be made to moderate or divert a few dominant focus group participants (e.g. Krueger and Casey 2000; Morgan 1996, 1997) from dominating the conversation. Indeed, such forceful personalities were allowed to thrive in our focus group environment, when they emerged, as they were likely to be powerful cultural foils for the other focus group participants.

Table 1 Percent similarity between pre- and post-information across focus groups

	Hierarchical-individualist (FG1)	Hierarchical-communitarian (FG2)	Egalitarian-individualist (FG3)	Egalitarian-communitarian (FG4)
<i>Pre-information portion</i>				
Hierarchical-individualist	1.0	0.708	0.661	0.616
Hierarchical-communitarian	0.708	1.0	0.861	0.856
Egalitarian-individualist	0.661	0.861	1.0	0.837
Egalitarian-communitarian	0.616	0.856	0.837	1.0
<i>Post-information portion</i>				
Hierarchical-individualist	1.0	0.925	0.925	0.780
Hierarchical-communitarian	0.925	1.0	0.925	0.883
Egalitarian-individualist	0.925	0.925	1.0	0.827
Egalitarian-communitarian	0.780	0.883	0.827	1.0

Computed using <https://www.twinword.com/api/text-similarity.php>

Table 2 Coding framework and intercoder reliability

Coding category	Scott's pi
<i>Characters: heroes, villains, and victims</i>	
Advocacy group	0.666
Business	0.991
Private individual	0.973
Government	0.981
Money	0.978
Rights*	0.152
<i>Moral or policy action</i>	
No action by a collective of people (nongovernmental)	0.666
Yes action by a collective of people (nongovernmental)	1.0
No action by a governmental person or entity	0.987
Yes action by a governmental person or entity	1.0
<i>Plot</i>	
Plot is present*	0.245
<i>Causal mechanisms (Stone 2012)</i>	
Mechanical	0.961
Intentional	1.0
Accidental	1.0
Inadvertent	1.0

*Scott's pi level does not meet the accepted threshold to be considered reliable

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of coding heroes, villains, and victims), policy solutions (moral of the story), and causal mechanisms⁶ (Table 2).

In line with previous NPF research content coding strategies (e.g., Smith-Walter et al. 2016, 2018), two researchers coded the focus group transcripts at the paragraph level of analysis for the presence-absence (0 or 1) of each category with reliability tests for each coded item (Table 2). The coders achieved an acceptable level of reliability for each coding category.⁷ The data were then analyzed in two ways to understand narrative differences between focus groups. First, the Kruskal–Wallis nonparametric test was conducted to understand statistical differences in narrative components (due to the ordinal nature of group membership). Variables found to exhibit statistically significant differences were then compared, group by group, to identify group differences. Because this research applies CC and NPF to campaign finance within focus groups for the first time, the researchers took a conservative approach to identifying relationships by choosing the Bonferroni correction to guard against Type I errors due to the large number of repeated hypotheses being tested. Second, a network analysis was conducted to understand the centrality, density, and core/periphery elements of narratives. Taken together, the results illuminate how groups constructed narratives before and after receiving information on campaign finance.⁸

5 Results

In many respects, groups had similar opinions, such as being pessimistic about the state of the country and negative feelings towards government, but their narrative constructions differ when examining characters, policy solutions, and, to a certain extent, causal mechanisms, the building blocks of what constitutes a policy narrative (Shanahan et al. 2018a). Consistent with our expectations, a unique narrative emerged from each focus group.⁹ We reveal our findings with a network analysis and more detailed node-level explorations of characters, plot, and causal mechanisms.

⁶ Plot was excluded from the analysis as it failed to achieve sufficient intercoder reliability (Scott's $\kappa = 0.245$).

⁷ Scores higher than .80 are generally considered acceptable (Lombard et al. 2002).

⁸ To address the possibility that a few strong personalities exerted disproportionate influence on the composition of the group narrative Spearman's Rho was utilized to correlate the CC score of each individual with the percentage of narrative elements that individual contributed during the discussion. CC scores computed for 37 participants ranged from 10 to 18, with a median score of 15. The individual contribution was computed by dividing the total number of coded narrative elements the individual used divided by the total number of narrative elements identified in the focus group (pre- and post- calculated separately). The correlation coefficient for the pre-information focus group conversation was .112, with a 1-tailed significance of .254 ($p < .05$). The coefficient for the post-information portion was .089 with a 1-tailed significance of .299 ($p < .05$). Therefore an individual's cultural cognitive score and desire for reform did not result in increased contribution of elements to the group narrative.

⁹ Some tangential observations are worth mentioning. No focus group discussed the topic of campaign finance in specific or technical policy terms. In fact, there was widespread confusion towards campaign finance policy in general. However, group members did speak passionately about their feelings towards elections, towards politicians and others, and used examples often to illustrate their points. Members made mention of current events, politicians and sports players to describe their feelings toward more general topics.

Table 3 Density measures for focus group's narrative network

	Avg. value	Total ties	SD	Avg. wtd degree
<i>Hierarchical-individualist (FG1)</i>				
PRE	0.159	168	0.980	5.091
POST	0.237	250	0.785	7.576
<i>Hierarchical-communitarian (FG2)</i>				
PRE	0.095	100	0.506	3.030
POST	0.136	144	0.568	4.364
<i>Egalitarian-individualist (FG3)</i>				
PRE	0.04	42	0.375	1.273
POST	0.061	64	0.282	1.939
<i>Egalitarian-communitarian (FG4)</i>				
PRE	0.191	202	0.861	6.121
POST	0.064	68	0.389	2.061

353 5.1 Pre-information narrative network comparison

354 We begin by comparing the narrative networks from the focus group discussion *prior to*
 355 *the introduction of specific campaign finance information*. Since we want to discover if dif-
 356 ferent narratives emerge from the groups (RQ1) we deploy social network analysis (SNA)
 357 to map and compare the characteristics of the narrative generated by each CC focus group.
 358 The analyzed networks were generated using the affiliation command in UCINET 6 for
 359 Windows which transforms a two-mode dataset (rows representing coded text and columns
 360 representing narrative elements) into a 1-mode adjacency matrix where the value of each
 361 cell reflects the number of links between each narrative element and all other narrative ele-
 362 ments using the sums of cross-products. Each node represents a narrative element (heroes,
 363 villains, victims, policy solutions, or causal mechanisms). Larger nodes indicate greater
 364 degree centrality of a node (narrative element) in the network. For instance, the hierarchi-
 365 cal-individualist pre-information narrative network map identifies a *private individual* as a
 366 villain with 20 links. The node is larger than the node for *money* which has 2 links. Links
 367 between the nodes represent instances where an element co-occurred with another element
 368 (in one coded paragraph). The darker lines indicate a greater frequency of co-occurrence.

369 The density measure for each focus group's narrative network was computed. Density is
 370 a measure that conveys the general level of connectivity between the nodes in the network
 371 and is calculated by dividing the total number of dyadic ties present in the network by the
 372 total number of all possible ties in the network (Yang et al. 2017, p. 58) (Table 3).

373 Prior to information dissemination by the moderator, we see egalitarian-communitarians
 374 have the densest network (19.1%), followed by the hierarchical-communitarians (15.9%).
 375 Hierarchical-communitarians and egalitarian-individualists demonstrate much lower nar-
 376 rative network density measures of 9.5% and 4.0% respectively. To discover whether the
 377 differences are statistically significant, we utilized the compare densities function (paired
 378 networks in UCINET 6) with 10,000 bootstrapped samples and found the hierarchical-
 379 communitarian network was significantly denser than the egalitarian-individualist net-
 380 work by 11.9% (Sig. 0.030 $p < .05$). Hierarchical-communitarian network density was
 381 significantly less dense than the egalitarian-communitarian one, by 9.7% (Sig. 0.045
 382 $p < .05$). The egalitarian-individualist network was significantly less dense than both the

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Table 4 Statistical significance of density between group comparisons (pre-information)

	Hierarchical-individualist (FG1) PRE	Hierarchical-communitarian (FG2) PRE	Egalitarian-individualist (FG3) PRE	Egalitarian-communitarian (FG4) PRE
Hierarchical-individualist PRE	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)
Hierarchical-communitarian PRE	Dif. 0.064 Sig. 0.089	(-)	(-)	(-)
Egalitarian-individualist PRE	Dif. 0.119* Sig. 0.030	Dif. 0.055 Sig. 0.079	(-)	(-)
Egalitarian-communitarian PRE	Dif. - 0.032 Sig. 0.514	Dif. - 0.097* Sig. 0.045	Dif. - 0.152* Sig. 0.011	(-)

* $p < .05$, Bootstrapped 10,000 iterations

383 hierarchical-communitarian and egalitarian-communitarian narrative network densities,
384 the latter by 15.2% (Sig. 0.011 $p < .05$) (Table 4).

385 Density differences are important pieces of information for understanding how CC and
386 the NPF combine to generate insights into narratives for at least two reasons. First, density
387 may represent a cognitive foundation amenable for future information incorporation (more
388 on this below). It is the contention of both the NPF's model of individual cognition (see
389 Shanahan et al. 2018b, c, pp. 179–183) and CC that existing beliefs and identity commit-
390 ments impact the assimilation of new information, so understanding the embeddedness of
391 relationships between existing narrative elements could be vital to anticipating the likely
392 power of a particular narrative to persuade a given group. Second, the density of a narra-
393 tive network may indicate a more cohesive story, with greater ties between narrative ele-
394 ments indicating connections between concepts, or at least the existence of more elements
395 the audience can identify with. This may represent an approach to exploring *narrativity*,
396 which is the notion that more complete stories are more persuasive (e.g., Crow and Berg-
397 gren 2014).

398 If the density of the narrative networks varies between cultural groups, what might this
399 mean for the study of narratives? We can begin by generating network maps for each of
400 the groups. The network diagrams (Fig. 2) show that differences in density translate to
401 “fuller” graphs for hierarchical-individualists and egalitarian-communitarians, as more
402 nodes are connected than in networks assembled by hierarchical-communitarians or
403 egalitarian-individualists.

404 In Fig. 2, the size of a node is directly related to the number of ties it has to other nodes
405 (degree centrality). Darker lines indicate more instances of connection existing in the same
406 paragraph. Larger nodes and darker lines help identify a distinction between network core and
407 periphery. The core/periphery measurement identifies nodes which constitute a “community”
408 with dense connections to other nodes and which have sparser connections with nodes not in
409 their community (Rombach et al. 2014). The core was identified using the MINRES algorithm
410 and the continuous function with 1000 iterations. The core is important for using SNA to ana-
411 lyze policy narratives because it brings to the forefront those narrative elements that are most
412 frequently employed together while simultaneously illustrating the elements' connectedness to
413 the entire network. UCINET 6 determines the core measures for each node in the network by
414 comparing its structure to an idealized core/periphery block where several nodes with direct
415 and dense ties exist without ANY connections to other nodes in the network. If the network




Fig. 2 Focus group 1 (hierarchical-individualist) pre-information network map




Fig. 3 Focus group 2 (hierarchical-communitarian) pre-information network map

416 under investigation matches this model exactly, values for core nodes will equal 1.0, and nodes
 417 that demonstrate more “coreness” return values closer to 1.0 (Everett and Borgatti 2005). If
 418 we find that the four narrative cores contain different elements and links, we can consider that
 419 differences in CC may contribute to the structuring of narrative networks (Figs. 3, 4, 5). AQ5

420 Drawing on these diagrams, and the density, centrality, and core/periphery measures
 421 applied to the four pre-information narrative networks, we can easily identify the similari-
 422 ties and differences between the story structures.

423 5.1.1 Causal mechanisms

424 Previous studies have found many narratives use intentional causal mechanisms, as villains
 425 are highlighted as an entity to combat (Shanahan et al. 2014). Below are examples of how
 426 these mechanisms arose in the focus group narratives.

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


Fig. 4 Focus group 3 (egalitarian-individualist) pre-information network map




Fig. 5 Focus group 4 (egalitarian-communitarian) pre-information network map

427 *Intentional* policymakers might be accused of making policies to increase their personal
428 wealth.

429 *Inadvertent* the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 might be explained
430 as having raised inflation.

431 *Mechanical* a bad policy might be explained as resulting from an unthinking
432 bureaucracy.

433 *Accidental* fluctuations in the price of commodities due to the weather.

434 One interesting aspect revealed by the narrative network maps is that each group
435 expressed that campaign finance was a problem caused by intentional action to accomplish
436 desired goals. That this emerged from all groups may indicate an understanding that the
437 system of campaign finance is a product of human construction, maintenance, and manipu-
438 lation. Unlike harm caused by natural disasters (accidental cause), machines (mechanical)
439 or carelessness (inadvertence), injury caused by the campaign finance system is seen by all
440 as intentional. This lack of ambiguity renders “the problem” of campaign finance amenable
441 to a policy solution (Stone 2012), which is supported by extant campaign finance literature
442 (e.g., Jorgensen et al. 2018). It is also important to note the HI, EI, and EC narratives con-
443 nect the network nodes *Intentional Cause* and *Villain: Government* in their network’s core.
444 Government does not occupy this key role in the core of hierarchical-communitarians. Per-
445 haps HC’s are simply more favorably disposed toward the federal government (by virtue of
446 their high grid and high group scores) and thus unwilling to craft a story with government
447 as a core villain.

448 The final element in the pre-information narrative network core shared by EC and EI
449 groups is private individuals as victims.

450 EI: “Yeah, and then they’re taking it down on us regular folk, and bumpin’ up our
451 property taxes, you know?”

452 EC: “But it’s just going to destroy a lot of middle-class families when you say, “Hey,
453 you know, it’s illegal to have, you know, unions.” And we called our politicians and
454 you’d think that they would listen to you. And I know we have republicans and dem-
455 ocratic teachers that were calling and you know, and fireman and whatnot. And they
456 absolutely said, “We don’t care. This is what the big money people want us to do. So,
457 we’re just going to ignore your vote.”

458 With the use of “regular folk” and “middle-class families” both groups associate the inten-
459 tional exercise of power by malevolent government (in the case of EC’s), businesses, and
460 private individuals with harm done to average Americans. This construction, also manifest-
461 ing along the grid-dimension, suggests egalitarians of both varieties generate more cohe-
462 sive campaign finance stories prior to possessing policy-relevant information. This may be
463 due to factors related to the universe of characters in these stories, and to these characters
464 we now turn.

465 5.2 Characters

466 Coded character categories include heroes (government, private individuals, and advocacy
467 groups), villains (government, private individuals, advocacy groups, business, and money)
468 and victims (government, private individuals, rights, and business). Given the CC quad-
469 rants defined above, we would expect that focus groups situated on the individualist side,
470 i.e., hierarchical-individualist and egalitarian-individualist, would cast heroes as private
471 individuals, villains as government and advocacy groups, and victims as private individ-
472 uals. Similarly, we would expect communitarian focus groups, i.e., hierarchical-commu-
473 nitarian and egalitarian-communitarian, would cast heroes as government and advocacy
474 groups, villains, as private individuals, business, and money, and victims as government.
475 However, the pre-information narratives generated by the four different groups failed to
476 demonstrate any statistically significant differences between ANY heroes or victims (see
477 Table 5). When we narrow our attention to the narrative core, we don’t find ANY heroes

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478 and only the aforementioned private individual as victim in EI and EC cores. These par-
479 ticular stories are driven by villains. Since the focus groups dealt with campaign finance
480 law, and villains like government and corporations were key to building a story about the
481 issue, it is not surprising that the HC group didn't generate a more cohesive network; inten-
482 tional causes require villains and the likely villains in campaign finance reform are mani-
483 festations of entities hierarchical-communitarians tend to admire.

484 5.2.1 Heroes

485 Heroes are those characters who are cast as those who will fix the problem. The complex-
486 ity of identifying heroes as individuals or government lay in that an individual must work
487 within the system to affect change. For example, one member of focus group 1 (HI) rec-
488 ognized citizens' capacity to stand up and make a difference (individualism) but situated
489 this individuality within the community of the tea party: "We're grassroots, we're not a big
490 corporation, we're just people wanting to make a change. And that seems like that would
491 influence the whole corruption big money." As the network maps show, while each cultural
492 narrative identified heroes that could be situated on opposite ends of the Group continuum,
493 no hero was central enough to the story of campaign finance to exist in the narrative core.

494 5.2.2 Victims

495 The victim is the character who suffers at the hands of the villain. The primary victims for
496 campaign finance were the government and the private individual. For the members of the
497 HI group, corporations play a role like that of individuals, valuing freedom and choice for
498 them as well. "They made it sound like corporations, the people, who spend a lot of money
499 in elections is a bad thing. But do we ever stop and think, why do we tax corporations?
500 Corporations shouldn't have to pay money...what you end up doing is you stifle growth."
501 As one HI member said, "...in the society where we're basing our life on freedom and you
502 start telling people what they should and shouldn't do with their money, which can be a lot
503 farther reaching than any of us realize." The hierarchical-communitarian and egalitarian-
504 communitarians victims tended to center on money's threat to the public interest. "...who-
505 ever puts in the most money...they're going to end up on Saturday Night Live...and that
506 is going to influence the public, and then really in the long run their guy is going to get in,
507 and I feel powerless when I hear that kind of thing." As with heroes, no statistically signifi-
508 cant differences in frequency of victims arose between the four groups.

509 5.2.3 Villains

510 Villains are the characters responsible for the problem and it is here the differences between
511 the CC groups begin to acquire more resolution. Participants in the focus groups devel-
512 oped narratives that spent considerable time expounding on villains. Focusing on the gov-
513 ernment as villain across the entire network (not simply examining the core) by using the
514 Kruskal-Wallis H test, we reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the groups
515 ($p = .036 < 0.05$). Digging deeper, we see that only two groups' use of government as vil-
516 lain were statistically significant. Applying the Mann-Whitney U test to the four pairs, we
517 find that statistically significant differences are only found between hierarchical-communi-
518 tarians and egalitarian-individualists ($p = .009 < 0.01$). The test also found that power as a
519 villain (i.e., power corrupts) demonstrated a significant difference between groups (8.581,

Table 5 Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U Test Pre-Information

	Kruskal-Wallis H	Df	Asymp. Sig.	FG1-FG2 Sig.	FG1-FG3 Sig.	FG1-FG4 Sig.	FG2-FG3 Sig.	FG2-FG4 Sig.
Villain: government	8.571	3	.036*	.076	.009 [‡]	.579	.617	.204
Villain: power	8.581	3	.035*	.141	.066	.079	1.00	1.00
Mechanical cause	18.317	3	.000*	.068	.003 [‡]	.005 [‡]	.212	.233
Intentional cause	21.528	3	.000*	.000 [‡]	.002 [‡]	.038	.120	.020
Accidental cause	83.213	3	.000*	.000 [‡]	.274	1.00	.000 [‡]	.000 [‡]
Inadvertent cause	8.581	3	.035*	.141	.066	.079	1.00	1.00

*Statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level

[‡]Statistically significant at the $p < .01$ level using Bonferroni Correction on Mann-Whitney U test

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520 $p = .035 < 0.05$) at the $p = 0.05$ level, but the stricter p value of 0.01 required by the Bon-
521 ferroni correction when comparing the four groups individually to one another, failed to
522 identify a significant difference between them.¹⁰ Concerning villains in the pre-informa-
523 tion stage, Grid is the operative scale here, as the HI group demonstrated more instances
524 ($n = 29$) than the EI group ($n = 10$) painting government as villain. The HI focused on bad-
525 natured individuals in government, and not the system as a whole. "...the politician in
526 office has such a tremendous advantage because they can squeeze to get the money. They
527 know how to say, 'yeah, we'll talk about that after your donation.'" In contrast, when HC
528 narratives did identify government as villain, it was because individuals in government
529 were not acting in the public interest. "Well, right now they are not living up to the role
530 because they are not solving issues before them and it's very, very divisive. It's very, very
531 political. And so they are not performing the role that they have or should be doing." These
532 distinctions provide support for CC's theory that HI's, "Marlboro men" will be extremely
533 critical of external forms of authority infringing on their own domains of organized social
534 relations.

535 However, when we consult the narrative network map, we see that despite the lack
536 of statistically significant differences demonstrated in by the Kruskal–Wallis H and
537 Mann–Whitney U tests, three of the four groups (HI, EI, and EC) identified the govern-
538 ment as a villain in their network core. The coreness measure was 0.611 in HC narratives,
539 0.540 for EC, and 0.516 for EI. Recalling that the core measure is derived from comparing
540 the matrix under investigation with an idealized core model (of 1.0), these values indicate
541 that the coreness of these measures is not slight. The government as villain achieved a
542 coreness score of only 0.287 in the HC narrative, which shows that the HC group tended
543 not to blame government, supporting CC's theoretical stance that HC's will generally value
544 structure and authority.

545 These findings indicate that all groups identify the problems arising in campaign finance
546 as generated by intentional human action, and all core narratives, excluding hierarchical-
547 communitarians, lay at least some of the blame at the feet of the government. We can see
548 that a villain that is accessible via existing cultural cognitive understandings allows the for-
549 mation of more cohesive stories absent additional information. Hierarchical-individualism
550 opposes the imposition of federal government on their local forms of hierarchy, egalitarian-
551 individualism resents what they see as government waste and incompetence demonstrated
552 in the statements like, "I don't understand why Congress people are receiving a paycheck,
553 when they haven't obviously passed our previous [sic], the budget?" Egalitarian-communi-
554 tarians, on the other hand, have a more complex relationship that seems to emphasize the
555 intersection between politicians and business interests, as seen in this statement, "But you
556 see it happen every single time a president comes in and then when he leaves office the
557 company that gave him the most money he becomes a consultant. Probably doesn't show
558 up but just, you know, to give a speech and he makes a million dollars a year for, you know,
559 the next 20 years or whatever as a consultant, you know, to that organization that gave him
560 all that money."

¹⁰ When using the Kruskal–Wallis H, the non-parametric equivalent of ANOVA, the initial result will simply indicate whether there is a statistically significant difference among the several categories tested. If a significant difference is discovered, further analysis of the differences between each of the groups using a Mann–Whitney U test is recommended. However, as the original significance value is $p < 0.05$, then this p value needs to be divided by the number of group comparisons to establish the 0.01 value for the results of the Mann–Whitney U test, this is known as the Bonferroni correction.

561 To summarize the findings related to the relationship between characters and plot
562 we could describe the initial formulation for HI's narrative as "government as corrupt",
563 for EI's "government as incompetent", and for EC's as "government as co-conspirator".
564 HC's have no initial core, since they apparently are not wont to demonize government,
565 though they too recognize the problem as within human ability to control.

566 5.3 Policy actions or moral of the story

567 We operationalized the NPF's moral of the story as policy actions. For example, a pro-
568 government action solution was voiced in the EI narrative when it was stated that "The
569 government that is there for the people, they should step in and say, 'Hey, this per-
570 son who can't afford three hundred a month, should not be given thirteen thousand"; a
571 con-government action solution would have expressed opposition to such a statement.
572 A pro-collective action other than government policy solution called for people to work
573 together in the sphere of civil society to address the issue of campaign finance. A state-
574 ment made in the EC focus group is indicative this type of solution, "I mean, this makes
575 sense to me because, you know, you do fundraisers and you might get 100 people some-
576 where and ya'll donate \$200. You do that all over the country and you can fund them
577 like that." While four policy actions were coded, none demonstrated statistically signifi-
578 cant differences using the Kruskal-Wallis H test: statements indicating support for gov-
579 ernment action (.989 > *p*. 05) against government action (.131 > *p*. 05) as well as state-
580 ments advocating/opposing non-governmental or collective action by citizens (.109 > *p*
581 .05/1.183 > *p*. 05). This result is, in a certain respect, not surprising since none of the
582 focus groups identified any hero in the narrative core to undertake corrective action. It
583 is important to note this changes when comparing the pre-information narratives to the
584 post-information narratives.

585 5.4 Post-information narrative structure within focus group comparisons

586 Moving now to the post-information analysis, it is important to remind the reader that the
587 comparisons that will be made for the remainder of the article contrast pre-information
588 narrative structure with post-information structure within individual CC focus groups. The
589 moderator encouraged groups to range fairly freely in their discussion, and thus informa-
590 tion provided to individuals prior to presentation of policy relevant information on cam-
591 paign finance and the Grants and Franklins project (a government-based campaign finance
592 reform policy) was not identical. However, handouts provided to each participant were
593 identical, and the moderator provided three similar hypothetical arguments, one in favor
594 and two opposed to the Grants and Franklins project (see Appendix 2). Comparing the
595 post-information network of any group with its pre-information network is a way to assess
596 how the introduction of new information impacted the development of each CC narrative.
597 We begin by discussing changes in overall network measures.

598 We see the network density for the EC group was significantly reduced by providing
599 more information, while the other groups showed no significant change (see Table 6). This
600 is surprising since the density of the EC narrative network was highest prior to receiving
601 the policy relevant information. Why this group should display such a significant drop is an
602 interesting question, and one that will be explored in more detail below (Figs. 6, 7, 8, 9).

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Table 6 Statistical significance of density within group comparisons (pre/post information)

	Hierarchical-individualist (FG1) PRE	Hierarchical-communitarian (FG2) PRE	Egalitarian-individualist (FG3) PRE	Egalitarian-communitarian (FG4) PRE
Hierarchical-individualist POST	Dif. 0.078 Sig. 0.113	(-)	(-)	(-)
Hierarchical-communitarian POST	(-)	Dif. 0.042 Sig. 0.309	(-)	(-)
Egalitarian-individualist POST	(-)	(-)	Dif. 0.021 Sig. 0.400	(-)
Egalitarian-communitarian POST	(-)	(-)	(-)	Dif. - 0.127* Sig. 0.024

* $p < .05$, Bootstrapped 10,000 iterations




Fig. 6 Focus group 1 (hierarchical-individualist) post-information network map

603 5.5 Characters

604 5.5.1 Heroes

605 The post-information narratives feature heroes in the core of HI and EI groups. In both
606 cases, the heroes were, as the group dimension of CC would suggest, private individuals.

607 **FG1 (HI):** “The thing that, the thing we most need to understand is our found-
608 ing fathers had a reason why they set up everything the way they set out to do
609 and really quite brilliantly... But they also allowed us to spend whatever money,
610 each person, each corporation wanted to at that time because that’s another way

Author Proof




Fig. 7 Focus group 2 (hierarchical-communitarian) post-information network map




Fig. 8 Focus group 3 (egalitarian-individualist) post-information network map

611 to make...almost like the three different branches of government, how they all
 612 work together. So you're not just having the voting public, whether it's a ignorant
 613 vote or whatever making their vote based upon whose pretty or who says the

The stories groups tell: campaign finance reform and the narrative...




Fig. 9 Focus group 4 (egalitarian-communitarian) post-information network map

614 right thing. You got some people that if you got money, not very often do you get
 615 because it's lucky. You get it because you got some kind of intelligence and that
 616 helps guide that somewhat.

617 **FG3 (EI):** Okay, but to me, what was good about that is, he was out among the
 618 people. Had been for a long time, and reflected a most of the state. I'm not say-
 619 ing everyone, I'm not even saying me, but a huge portion of our state. Without
 620 massive corporations backing him. Like one corporation getting him in. And if
 621 somehow that could play a part on a national level, where, your guy reflected the
 622 majority of the people, and somehow those people contributed, or voted, where
 623 who actually got in reflected us, not just one corporation, that's ideal.

624 The private individual is employed differently, with the HI narrative equating smart
 625 individuals with rich individuals and portraying their contributions as a check on igno-
 626 rant voters. The private individual, for the EI, is a person who works in the system for
 627 the good of the majority. This provides support for using CC to understand narrative
 628 differences, as both focus on the individual as an agent of positive change. The HI
 629 narrative is animated by the idea that an individual success in the economy should
 630 translate into greater influence in selecting national leaders, via campaign donations.
 631 EI stories do not focus on the distinction between intelligent and ignorant participants
 632 in the political process, but on the elected individual actually representing the will of
 633 the majority, while eschewing the unequal influence of concentrated economic power.
 634 These changes in narrative could be explained by the difference in grid influencing
 635 the nature of the hero employed in high- or low-grid worldviews and the high- or low-
 636 group aspect influencing whether a hero even enters the core narrative.

637 5.5.2 Victims

638 No victims were found in the narrative core of any group in the post-information por-
639 tion of the focus group. The EI and EC core didn't carry the private individual as victim
640 over from their pre-information core. It is unclear what this might mean, but it may be
641 that moving from the pre-information stage where the dialogue was conditioned more
642 so by the influence of the variation in CC worldviews toward a discussion of a specific
643 policy proposal sharpened the focus to groups that were unlikely to be viewed charita-
644 bly by egalitarians.

645 5.5.3 Villains

646 The post-information portion of the focus group lead to a substantial change in the vil-
647 lains found in the narrative cores of each of the four groups. The hierarchical-commu-
648 nitarian narrative core retained government as a villain, but it was less of a core node
649 than the new villain, private individuals. The crux of this villain was a direct response
650 to the Grants and Franklin project's call for the first \$50 of federal taxes paid by each
651 voting-age citizen to be transformed into a "democracy voucher" that individuals could
652 direct to the politician(s) of their choice or elect to have it spent on voting infrastructure
653 if they did not approve of any candidate.

654 **FG1 (HI):** Overall I don't see a clear connection between, you know, campaign
655 finance and how politicians get to Washington to the problems that we have
656 because you know, whether a politician, you know, got there on a string bean
657 budget or Kennedy type budget, if they're corrupt, they're corrupt. And they
658 reflect the people in their district. So they're [sic] the people in their district are
659 freedom loving and gun totting or whether they are in the North and like to drink
660 their tea with their pinkies up. The congressmen are going to reflect the values and
661 the morals of their constituents and...

662 The HI narrative emphasizes that the major problem is that individuals are likely to take
663 advantage of the system and many of the citizens are generally flawed. Again, CC helps
664 to explain this emergence, since many of the reasons the HI group opposes the initiative
665 relates to the need to check the excesses of democracy.

666 The rise of a new villain also occurs in the narrative core of the hierarchical-commu-
667 nitarian. This villain emerged from the detail in the Grants and Franklin proposal that
668 allowed politicians to opt-out of the system and raise their money from private dona-
669 tions. This generated a consensus that businesses would oppose the system and that
670 public finance couldn't overcome corporate money without additional restrictions on
671 corporate behavior.

672 **FG2 (HC):** But, these big corporations like Halliburton, that get all the govern-
673 ment contracts have got to know that there's millions and millions of dollars for
674 campaign funding. And, if they just said, "Stop, no more, and if we catch you
675 doing it, here is the penalty."

676 This call is also in keeping with what CC would predict from hierarchical-communitar-
677 ians, the call for public authorities to establish rules and regulations that would advance
678 the public good and bring order to the process.

The stories groups tell: campaign finance reform and the narrative...

679 The Egalitarian-Individualist (FG3) narrative core also featured a new villain post-infor-
680 mation: the private individual. This villain was, as in the hierarchical-communitarian core
681 narrative, the ignorant voter.

682 **FG3 (EI):** But it just comes back to that same whole ignorance thing, that if peo-
683 ple don't know, and then they're bombarded with this message, and how many of us
684 really, when we have this coverage? I know I did. I'm sorry, I do the research on the
685 candidates, I do the research on the bills, cause' I'm around to care. I don't want it to
686 just be a vote. You know? I don't want to be ashamed. Cause I know what I voted for.
687 At the end of the day, it comes back and I voted for something I really didn't stand for
688 or believe in, so I mean, I know that I'm going to know what I vote for. How many of
689 the average American's that vote will?

690 This seems to indicate that individualists may have reacted to the plan to use public power
691 to redistribute resources to level the playing field in campaign finance by casting doubt on
692 their fellow citizens to wisely exercise this power. The egalitarian-communitarian narrative
693 core did not add any new villains in the post-information stage.

694 5.6 Policy actions or moral of the story

695 Neither egalitarian-communitarian nor hierarchical-communitarian core narratives con-
696 tained policy solutions. However, both hierarchical- and egalitarian-individualist core
697 narratives employed a moral to the story. The solution preferred by the HI narrative was
698 one that was promoting opposition to government action, the Grants and Franklin project
699 specifically. This component relied on a distrust of the government and its power over
700 individuals.

701 **FG1 (HI):** "This just seems un-American. It just doesn't seem like it would be in a
702 free market society. I just don't see it working."

703 The egalitarian-individualist core narrative, instead of opposing government action, pro-
704 poses that collective action outside of government proper can correct some of the weak-
705 nesses of the current campaign finance system and its impact on contemporary politics.

706 **FG3 (EI):** And there's a lot of government responsible for that. So, as for Obama
707 being the problem. It's years, and accumulation of years and years and years of being
708 let down and the people, all of us, relying on the government, instead of being the
709 government.

710 The use of network mapping and core and periphery measures provided evidence that each
711 group's core narrative was impacted by the provision of policy-relevant information and a
712 specific policy proposal.

713 6 Discussion: cultural cognition and the NPF

714 In all, we find that cultural cognition as a lens can provide interesting insights into the
715 influence of culture on the completeness and density of narratives generated in a low sali-
716 ence policy area. To explicitly answer our first research question, groups holding exclusive
717 CC worldviews will generate different narratives from one another, though the differences
718 are not always that stark and there certainly are facets of congruence across narratives.

719 We have statistical evidence in the form of Mann–Whitney U tests from the pre-informa-
720 tion analysis that finds significant differences between all forms of causal mechanisms
721 (Mechanical, Intentional, Accidental, and Inadvertent), and that hierarchical-individualists
722 are more likely to use government as a villain than groups with a different CC orientation.

723 In addition to those statistical differences, we also observe variation by looking at the
724 network maps of the pre-information narratives. Coupled with the density measures, we
725 see that the intentional cause occupies a position in each and every group's narrative core.
726 However, the H-C (FG2) narrative core isn't comprised of any concept other than an inten-
727 tional cause, and the H-I (FG1) adds only a villain in the form of Government. However,
728 egalitarian groups (E-I and E-C) both displayed more developed networks of narrative
729 components, with Private Individuals playing the victim in both groups' narratives. E-C
730 (FG4) had an even more robust group of villains, featuring Private Individuals and Busi-
731 ness, in addition to Government. This multiplicity of villains may serve to bolster the "us
732 versus them" dynamic which CC indicates animates this culture (Douglas and Wildavsky
733 1982). We also see that egalitarian pre-information narratives (E-I and E-C) both feature
734 a victim, a feature lacking from the narrative core of either of the hierarchist groups (H-I
735 and H-C). This seems to suggest that for those with a strong egalitarian culture, the iden-
736 tification and deployment of a victim is part of their narrative sense-making that differed
737 from those with a strong individualist culture. We can therefore say, at least tentatively, that
738 groups did produce narratives which differed in important ways from one another prior to
739 the presentation of campaign finance information, including the Grants and Franklins Pro-
740 ject reform policy solution.

741 Turning to our second research question, does the provision of additional information
742 with regard to campaign finance reform result in changes to the structure of narratives pro-
743 duced in focus groups with homogenous CC worldviews? It seems that the answer is a tenta-
744 tive yes, as we saw that the core of each focus group did, in fact, change when new infor-
745 mation was made available and the framing of the discussion became solidified in reaction
746 to the Grants and Franklins proposal. However, in all cases, certain things did not change.
747 For instance, in all pre- and post- groups, the problem was seen to be caused intentionally.
748 In the HI, EI, and EC groups, government was portrayed as a victim pre- and post-informa-
749 tion. While the HC group did NOT identify government as a core villain in either portion
750 of the focus group. The EI narrative core featured private individuals as villains in both
751 pre- and post-information, and so did the EC narrative core.

752 When looking for patterns in the changes in the narrative network core from pre- and
753 post-information states, it is interesting to note that both narratives of the groups with a
754 "low-group" worldview (HI and EI) moved from a less elaborate core to a more elaborate
755 core, and that they shared four of the five elements in the post-information model. How-
756 ever, while the similarities are undeniable, the "coreness" of the elements, and the differ-
757 ence in the desired policy solution point to distinct narratives, though ones that share a
758 familial resemblance. It is likely that this structure is one that emerges from opposition to
759 the Grants and Franklins project, as government and private individuals were both villains
760 and private individuals were also heroes. The distrust of government and other citizens
761 may then be understood as an aversion to attempts to leverage public power to address
762 social ills. Instead, the individualists try to deflect the use of governmental redistribution
763 by decrying the loss of freedom of speech or by casting doubt on the ability of fellow citi-
764 zens to effectively utilize the proposed resources.

The stories groups tell: campaign finance reform and the narrative...

765 Looking at the communitarian side of the coin (HC and EC) we see that the “high-
766 group” cultures both fail to deploy a policy solution in their narrative core. It may be that
767 the Grants and Franklins project was simply a culturally congenial solution they could
768 endorse. If this was the case, the groups may have felt little need to focus on providing
769 an alternative and could spend more time focusing on the reason to support the plan. This
770 would explain the emergence of Business as a villain in the HC narratives.

771 The implications of our findings are several. Each group, presented with similar infor-
772 mation about campaign finance policy in the United States, formed a narrative distinct
773 from the others. These differences were discernable based upon a deductive coding scheme
774 provided by the NPF and the fitting of that schema to the belief system approach of the
775 Cultural Cognition Project at Yale University. From a theoretical perspective, our analysis
776 shows how two approaches might be applied to better understand how individuals within
777 groups leverage their core beliefs—and their parent cultures—to come to terms with com-
778 plex information environments via narrative sense-making. But beyond ivory tower curios-
779 ity, why should we care? This leads us to our second and more important implication. What
780 stands out to us is the stark differences in the stories told within each focus group, despite
781 being presented with analogous information. The practical implications are not trivial. It
782 is increasingly apparent that it can no longer be assumed that naked information is sim-
783 ply communicated objectively to relevant publics or individuals. Rather, their backgrounds,
784 existing knowledge, affiliations, and their cultures must also be accounted for. While our
785 study does not speak to how better to communicate important information to these popula-
786 tions, it does provide some insight into how culture and groups help individuals navigate
787 complex information environments.

788 **7 Contribution of narrative network analysis to political culture**

789 Finally, we would like to close with some broader observations about the integrating CC
790 theory with an NPF-based narrative network analysis and how it potentially benefits the
791 study of political culture more generally. People tell stories to make meaning of their world,
792 regardless of the political culture typology that one might employ. As such, an NPF-based
793 narrative network analysis can easily travel across cultural approaches. Another advantage
794 of the narrative network analysis is that it manages to address a problem that exists when
795 studying political culture, which is the precise location of culture. Is it carried by the indi-
796 vidual? Does it manifest in family units, work locations, political parties? Is the state (or
797 nation) the host of culture? More to the point, regardless of where the culture is thought to
798 reside, the interaction between social units of divergent cultural commitments is likely to
799 be a source of conflict. Since this study utilizes CC measures to categorize individuals and
800 then analyzes the narratives which emerge from the interaction within the group, we can
801 see how differing cultures can help to shape the stories by which individuals make sense of
802 a policy problem. While this approach does not explore the inherent power dynamics that
803 would exist within other social units (such as the family or the workplace), it does take a
804 step toward recognizing the role of the group and the power of homogenous cultural values
805 in generating distinct narrative structures.

806 **Appendix 1**

Author Proof

Appendix A

RESPONDENT NAME: _____

SCREENER

Hello, my name is _____ of {INSERT ORGANIZATION NAME}, a local opinion research company. We are conducting a research project among a group of people in the {INSERT CITY} area. This is a very brief survey to determine if you are qualified for this research... (DO NOT PAUSE)

1. What is your age?
 Under 18..... **TERMINATE**
 18+ continue

2. Now I want to ask you a question about campaign finance reform. Would you say that *you strongly agree, agree, mildly agree, mildly disagree, disagree, strongly disagree or don't know* about the following statement:

The way in which congressional campaigns are currently financed and paid for is in serious need of reform.

- Strongly Disagree **TERMINATE**
- Disagree **TERMINATE**
- Mildly Disagree **TERMINATE**
- Mildly Agree continue to 3
- Agree..... continue to 3
- Strongly Agree continue to 3

- Don't Know **TERMINATE**

3. **Lead-in:** People in our society often disagree about how far to let people make their own decisions. For each of the following statements, please tell us whether you disagree or agree.

{Random Order}

- IPROTECT:** It's not the government's business to try to protect people from themselves.
- IPRIVACY:** The government should stop telling people how to live their lives.
- IINTRSTS:** The government interferes far too much in our everyday lives.
- CHARM:** Sometimes government needs to make laws that keep people from hurting themselves.


H: Top Quartile (+4 to +6).....continue to 5

5. INVITATION IF INDIVIDUAL MEETS RECRUITING CRITERIA:

Thank you for answering all of my questions. You're eligible to participate in the discussion group. We have openings {INSERT DATE} at __pm. The discussion should last about an hour. As a token of appreciation for helping us in our research efforts, you will receive a cash gratuity of \$75. Can we schedule you to attend?

We want four focus groups where each of the following combinations are represented:

- | | | |
|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| H / C: | H = +4 to +6 | C = +4 to +6 |
| H / I: | H = +4 to +6 | I = -4 to -6 |
| E / C: | E = -4 to -6 | C = +4 to +6 |
| E / I: | E = -4 to -6 | I = -4 to -6 |



808

809 **Appendix 2: Campaign finance focus group discussion guide**

810 *Welcome* Good evening and welcome to our discussion session on campaign finance. I'd
 811 like to thank you for taking valuable time out of your evening to participate in our ses-
 812 sion. You have all been selected because you showed some interest in how campaigns are
 813 financed. My name is Michael Jones. I'm currently with the Edmond J. Safra Center for
 814 Ethics at Harvard, but just recently finished up my doctorate in political science at the Uni-
 815 versity of Oklahoma. I will be facilitating the discussion this evening.

The stories groups tell: campaign finance reform and the narrative...

816 *Ground rules* The ground rules for our discussion today are pretty straight forward. As you
817 all know, the discussion needs to be civil but everybody should feel inclined to speak freely.
818 Additionally there are no right or wrong answers and everyone's opinions and thoughts are
819 valued here. I also ask that everyone turn their cell phones to silent for the next hour and a
820 half and that we do not text during the session. (*Note where the bathrooms are located*). **AQ6**

821 Additionally, it is important for everyone to know that you are going to be recorded dur-
822 ing this session. Although we won't be talking about anything sensitive tonight, it is also
823 important for you to know that nothing you say will be attributed to you directly. Every-
824 thing will be kept anonymous so, please feel comfortable to speak your mind.

825 *Discussion questions*

826 1. Introductions

827 2. In one word, how would you describe the state of the country?

828 3. What role do you think money plays in campaigns?

829 4. Tell Me a Story about Campaign Finance

830 a. As you understand it, what are the rules about donating to campaigns?

831 b. Is there anyone hurt by this process?

832 c. Who are the bad guys here?

833 d. What are the solutions? What sorts of reform should be advocated?

834 5. Give Participants the handout

835 a. The Facts: Page 1-2

836 b. The Grant and Franklin Proposal: Page 3

837 c. Some Responses to a few messages about the proposal: Page 4

838 6. Bonus topic:

839 a. Disclosure: What about increasing transparency so that the American public knows
840 who is sending the money and making the advertisements. Is this enough?

841 7. Closing Statement: I would like to thank everybody for participating and remind eve-
842 rybody that their comments will remain anonymous.

843 *Campaign Finance: In a Nutshell (Group 1, June 6th, 2011)*

844 • Candidates must disclose all donations over 200 dollars.

845 • Certain groups can't donate directly to candidates:

846 • Corporations

847 • Labor organizations (unions)

848 • Foreign Nationals

849 • Federal Government Contractors

850 • However, Labor and corporations may create a Political Action Committee (PAC) to
851 raise money for candidates.

852 • *Political Action Committees* are an organization designed to help get candidates elected,
853 advocate for a specific issue, or advocate for a specific law or legislation.

854 • *Independent Expenditures* Corporations and unions may essentially use unlimited
 855 amounts of funds to run advertisements for a specific candidate, provided they are not
 856 coordinated with the candidate.


857 *Donation Limits* it's a little more complicated than this, but for starters:

	Candidate per election	National political party, per year	State and local political party, per year	Any other political committee per year	Other
Individuals	\$2500	\$30,800	\$10,000	\$5000	\$117,000 per 2 years total
PACs	5000	15,000	5000	5000	No limit

858
859


860 *How many Americans donate in Elections?*

861 • Less than 1% (0.44%) of Americans donate \$200 or more; 0.12% donate \$2300 or
 862 more.



863

Total Cost of US Elections and Contributions Greater than \$200, by Year



864

The stories groups tell: campaign finance reform and the narrative...

865 Description of the Grants and Franklin Project provided to Focus Groups

866 We start off with the fact that nearly every registered voter in the United States pays at
867 least fifty dollars of federal tax.

868 So, that fifty dollars would be your first fifty dollars in tax dollars.

869 We take that first fifty dollars, and we turn it into a democracy voucher, that's what
870 they're calling it. And you get to decide, as the voter, who gets that money. You can decide
871 if it goes to one candidate, you can decide it goes to two candidates, you can decide it goes
872 to fifty candidates, one dollar to each. You can decide that you don't want to think that
873 much about politics, but you know you're a Republican or you know you're a Democrat
874 and you can just send the fifty dollars to the party, and the party will decide. Or, you could
875 decide that you're fed up with politics, and you don't really like either party that much,
876 and then you take the money and it goes to what they call democratic infrastructure. And
877 that means it's going to go towards things like voting machines, getting people registered,
878 getting people educated about how to get to the polls, that sort of stuff. So, if you don't
879 want to give the money to a candidate, you could send it off to make democracy better.
880 So, the argument goes. But there's still the ability to donate actual money to a candidate.
881 So, you've got your fifty dollars, but now there's another element that says ok, well, I feel
882 really passionate about candidate X because I'm a big gun owner and they're pro NRA.
883 Something along those lines. You want to give that candidate money. You can give that
884 candidate money, but you can only give that candidate one hundred dollars. And the rea-
885 soning behind that, for the people that I work with, think that a hundred dollars is a lot of
886 money to most Americans. And, so they think that it is a pretty fair limit.

887 So, you can give that hundred dollars, now the candidate, if they're going to get this
888 money, the only way that they can get this money is if they agree that's the only way, they
889 are going to get money. Is through this program. No PAC money, no corporation money,
890 just through this program. It would raise about six billion dollars. What do you guys think?

891 Appendix 3

892 See Table 7.

AQ7

Table 7 Participant cultural cognition strength, and narrative component contributions

Part. #	Cultural strength	% Narrative components contributed		Gender	Part. #	Cultural strength	% Narrative components contributed		Gender	
		Pre (%)	Post (%)				Pre (%)	Post (%)		
Hierarchical-individualist (FG1)										
A1	16.5	2.80	0.70	Male	B1	16.5	5.56	0.69	Female	
A2	10	10.49	10.56	Male	B2	11	5.56	19.31	Male	
A3	16.5	19.58	5.63	Male	B3	15	2.22	8.97	Male	
A4	12	4.90	11.97	Male	B4	12.5	15.56	8.28	Male	
A5	15	2.80	2.11	Female	B5	12.5	13.33	8.97	Male	
A6	18	9.09	11.27	Male	B6	12.5	24.44	6.21	Male	
A7	15	15.38	12.68	Male	B7	10	1.11	1.38	Female	
A8	11	11.89	23.94	Male	B8	15	11.11	21.38	Female	
A9	11	11.89	14.08	Male	B9	13.75	6.67	7.59	Female	
A10	18	11.19	6.34	Female	B10	15	14.44	16.55	Female	
Egalitarian-Individualist (FG3)										
C1	13.75	8.06	12.16	Female	D1	15	10.23	25.00	Male	
C2	15	11.29	18.92	Female	D2	13.75	0.00	4.55	Female	
C3	16.5	29.03	25.68	Male	D3	16.5	2.27	0.00	Female	
C4	11	14.52	13.51	Female	D4	12	12.50	0.00	Female	
C5	15	3.23	5.41	Female	D5	18	47.73	36.36	Male	
C7	13.75	0.00	6.76	Female	D6	12.5	4.55	0.00	Female	
C8	16.5	17.74	13.51	Female	D7	15	11.36	6.82	Male	
C9	10	16.13	4.05	Female	D8	11	1.14	6.82	Female	
					D9	16.5	10.23	20.45	Male	

The stories groups tell: campaign finance reform and the narrative...

Appendix 4

See Table 8.

Table 8 Non-significant differences pre-information

	Kruskal-Wallis H	Df	Asymp. sig.	HI-HC sig.	HI-EI sig.	HI-C sig.	HC-EI sig.	HC-EC sig.
Hero: Advocacy group	.000	3	1.000	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Hero: Business	.000	3	1.000	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Hero: Private individual	3.446	3	.328	.525	.195	.448	.077	.954
Hero: Government	4.678	3	.197	.676	.331	.084	.256	.094
Hero: Money	2.135	3	.545	.464	.361	.382	1.00	1.00
Hero: Power	.000	3	1.000	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Hero: Scientists	.000	3	1.000	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Hero: Other	.000	3	1.000	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Villain: Advocacy group	4.099	3	.251	.931	.247	.079	.326	.091
Villain: Business	6.491	3	.090	.034	.121	.011	.522	.737
Villain: Private individual	4.059	3	.255	.630	.170	.501	.090	.905
Villain: Money	1.573	3	.665	.172	.274	.252	.751	.801
Villain: Scientists	.000	3	1.000	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Villain: Other	6.735	3	.081	.172	1.00	.047	.212	.506
Victim: Advocacy group	3.108	3	.375	1.00	1.00	.252	1.00	.402
Victim: Business	4.277	3	.233	.300	.195	.216	1.00	1.00
Victim: Private individual	3.372	3	.338	.753	.138	.680	.137	.522
Victim: Government	.251	3	.969	.954	.671	.727	.751	.801
Victim: Money	6.065	3	.108	.053	.274	1.00	.326	.091
Victim: Power	.000	3	1.000	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Table 8 continued

	Kruskal–Wallis H	Df	Asymp. sig.	HI–HC sig.	HI–EI sig.	HI–C sig.	HC–EI sig.	HC–EC sig.
Victim: Scientists	.000	3	1.000	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Victim: Other	2.751	3	.432	1.00	.274	1.00	.423	1.00
Collective_Action_Other_Than_Gov (Con)	4.847	3	.183	.172	1.00	1.00	.212	.233
Collective_Action_Other_Than_Gov (Pro)	6.054	3	.109	.464	.361	.199	1.00	.145
Government_Action (Con)	5.625	3	.131	.920	.024	.292	.030	.391
Government_Action (Pro)	.121	3	.989	.935	.798	.982	.771	.954

*Statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level‡Statistically significant at the $p < .01$ level using Bonferroni Correction on Mann–Whitney U test

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Appendix 5

See Table 9.

Table 9 Non-significant differences post-information

	Kruskal-Wallis H	Df	Asymp. sig.	HI-HC sig.	HI-EI sig.	HI-EC sig.	HC-EI sig.	HC-EC sig.
Hero: Advocacy group	5.095	3	.165	.379	.062	.359	1.00	1.00
Hero: Business	0.00	3	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Hero: Private individual	3.200	3	.362	.470	.155	.170	.878	.512
Hero: Government	3.643	3	.303	.899	.109	.260	.242	.296
Hero: Money	5.095	3	.165	.379	.062	.359	1.00	1.00
Hero: Power	0.00	3	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Hero: Scientists	0.00	3	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Hero: Other	0.00	3	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Villain: Business	3.166	3	.367	.081	.405	.270	.233	.618
Villain: Money	1.285	3	.733	.831	.669	.359	.931	.296
Villain: Power	0.00	3	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Villain: Scientists	0.00	3	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Villain: Other	1.231	3	.746	.483	.913	.517	.491	2.96
Victim: Advocacy group	.794	3	.851	.535	.688	.517	.639	1.00
Victim: Business	7.682	3	.053	.281	.022	.260	1.00	1.00
Victim: Private individual	4.193	3	.241	.186	.616	.466	.054	.637
Victim: Government	3.917	3	.271	.540	.126	.147	.722	.298
Victim: Money	6.900	3	.075	.320	.062	.881	.003*	.517
Victim: Power	0.00	3	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Victim: Scientists	.000	3	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Table 9 continued

	Kruskal–Wallis H	Df	Asymp. sig.	HI-HC sig.	HI-EI sig.	HI-EC sig.	HC-EI sig.	HC-EC sig.
Victim: Other	2.538	3	.468	.535	.188	.519	1.00	1.00
Collective_Action_Other_Than_Gov (Con)	4.363	3	.225	.483	.188	.519	.034	.298
Collective_Action_Other_Than_Gov (Pro)	5.387	3	.146	.163	.126	.147	.414	1.00
Government Action (Pro)	3.499	3	.321	.470	.098	.913	.749	.466

*Statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level‡Statistically significance at the $p < .01$ level using Bonferroni Correction on Mann–Whitney U test

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